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mandatory imprisonment for serious crimes. 
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1. Introduction 
The literature on the economics of crime, pioneered by Becker (1968), Stigler (1970) 
and Polinsky and Shavell (1979, 1984), applies the economic approach of decisions 
under uncertainty to criminal behavior, assuming that the behavior of criminals does not 
differ in principle from the behavior of other economic agents. The main objective of 
this literature is to derive the socially optimal prosecution policy, which consists of the 
optimal size and type of punishment and of the optimal probability with which an 
offender is detected and punished. A prominent result of this literature is that 
imprisonment is not optimal if the offender is able to pay a fine instead. The economic 
intuition is straightforward: Imprisonment is costly for society, as prisons must be 
maintained and prisoners are hindered to take up legal employment. On the other hand, 
fines can be used to finance the police or to compensate victims. Therefore, Polinsky 
and Shavell (1984) conclude that it is desirable to use the fine to its maximum feasible 
extent before possibly supplementing it with an imprisonment term. 
This result is at odds with reality, however, because serious crimes are typically 
punished with mandatory imprisonment, so that the offender must serve a prison term 
although he could pay a (higher) fine. Moreover, the fines that are used in addition to 
such a mandatory prison term are usually quite small. In the United States of America, 
to give an example, every prison sentence is accompanied by a fine whose range 
depends on the offense level, a measure of the seriousness of the crime.1 For the lowest 
offense level that is associated with mandatory imprisonment, the maximum fine is 
$30,000 which is smaller than the wealth of most Americans.2 Polinsky and Shavell 
(2000) point out that most prisoners are poor and would not be able to pay a high fine. 
As long as there are some criminals who could pay the fine however, this fact cannot 
                                                 
1 In contrast to the U.S., fines on top of a prison sentence are unusual in the UK and Germany. In 
these two countries, fines and prison terms are regarded as alternative forms of punishment with 
imprisonment being reserved for serious offenses. 
2 The median family net worth – the difference between families’ gross assets and their liabilities – 
was $71,600 in 1998 (see Kennickell, Starr-McCluer and Surette, 2000). The maximum fine depending 
on the offense level can be found in §5E1.2 of the United States Sentencing Commission Guidelines 
Manual. 
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explain mandatory imprisonment, because it is still optimal that wealthy 
criminals pay the fine instead of being imprisoned. Even crimes that are typically 
committed by wealthy individuals, like bribery, embezzlement or environmental crimes, 
are often punished with mandatory imprisonment.3 Waldfogel (1995) finds in an 
empirical study on U.S. federal fraud offenses that fines average less than 3 months' 
preconviction income for offenders punished with both a fine and a prison term. 
This paper offers a new explanation for the wide-spread use of mandatory 
imprisonment for serious crimes that is based on agency conflicts.4 In particular, we 
assume that the government which decides on the police expenditures and thereby on 
the detection probability does not maximize social welfare but instead a weighted sum 
of social welfare and the residual budget. The residual budget is the government’s 
budget that remains after the police has been paid and fines have been collected. 
Potential reasons for the government’s interest in the residual budget are that it might 
have the right to decide what it is spent on or that the compensation of government 
officials increases with the size of the budget they oversee. We show that under this 
assumption mandatory imprisonment is welfare maximizing for serious crimes, i.e. for 
crimes associated with high harms and high punishments. If costs of imprisonment are 
taken into account, the optimal type of punishment is a combination of mandatory 
imprisonment and a fine, where the fine covers the costs of the prison term or a part of 
it. For less serious crimes, fines without imprisonment are optimal. 
In order to develop an intuition for this result, consider the two opposite effects an 
increase in the detection probability has on the revenues from fines. First, the proportion 
of criminals that are detected and fined increases, which raises the revenues from fines. 
On the other hand, more individuals are deterred from committing the crime, so that the 
                                                 
3 For the following offenses, the United States Sentencing Commission Guidelines Manual provides 
for mandatory imprisonment even though such offenders can be expected to be wealthy: commercial 
bribery if the bribe or the improper benefit to be conferred exceeds $5,000; criminal infringement of 
copyright or trademark if the retail value of the infringed items exceeds $40,000; embezzlement if the 
loss exceeds $120,000; evasion of export controls; repetitive discharge of a hazardous or toxic substance 
into the environment. 
4 Chu and Jiang (1993) and Levitt (1997) present alternative models in which imprisonment is 
employed before fines are used to their feasible extent. Both models, however, cannot explain mandatory 
imprisonment with small or no fines for serious crimes. 
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number of criminals decreases and revenues from fines drop. For less serious 
crimes which are associated with small punishments, the crime rate is comparatively 
high, so that the first effect dominates the second one. Here, the government will choose 
a detection probability that is higher than optimal in order to increase the residual 
budget. For more serious crimes on the other hand, the crime rate is comparatively 
small so that the second effect dominates and the government will choose a smaller-
than-optimal detection probability; it allows a higher-than-optimal crime rate in order to 
reap higher revenues from fines.5 For severe crimes, this policy will lead to a substantial 
loss to social welfare so that it becomes optimal to switch from a fine to mandatory 
imprisonment. Thereby, the perverse monetary incentives disappear and the government 
will be eager to choose a much higher detection probability in order to effectively deter 
criminals. 
Garoupa and Klerman (2001, 2002) also present a model with a rent-seeking 
government. They show that the prosecution policy chosen by this government differs 
significantly from the socially optimal prosecution policy. In our paper, we investigate 
whether a law that restricts the type of punishment to mandatory imprisonment can 
mitigate this distortion and lead to higher social welfare than letting the government 
choose the type of punishment as well. Formally, our paper therefore resembles 
Polinsky (1980), Friedman (1984), Besanko and Spulber (1989) and Garoupa (1997) 
who consider the delegation of law enforcement from a welfare maximizing principal to 
a rent-seeking agent. Note, however, that there is no such principal in our model and we 
therefore do not consider elaborate incentive contracts. Instead, we ask whether a 
simple constitutional restriction of the rent-seeking government is socially optimal. 
In spirit, our paper is similar to Friedman (1999), who points out that ‘inefficient’ 
punishments, in particular imprisonment, can be optimal if they can reduce the rent-
seeking behavior of the enforcers. Friedman argues that rent-seeking leads to over-
enforcement, i.e. to too many and possibly false convictions. Indeed, our model 
produces this result for less serious crimes. For serious crimes, however, the model 
                                                 
5 If fines are interpreted as taxes on the criminal activity, lowering the detection probability is 
tantamount to increasing the tax-base. In this sense, our argument is similar to Gordon and Wilson (1999) 
who show that officials with preferences for a high government’s budget will favor policies that increase 
the tax-base. 
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implies that enforcers have an incentive to under-enforce, thereby causing lower 
deterrence and higher crime rates. Note that under-enforcement is potentially a more 
serious problem than over-enforcement, because it cannot be corrected ex-post. Given 
the presence of an independent judiciary, over-enforcement can be easily offset by 
discarding some of the evidence. If enforcers know that evidence beyond the socially 
optimal threshold will not be considered, they have no incentive to over-enforce. A 
similar argument can be made for false accusations. In contrast, under-enforcement 
cannot be mitigated ex-post. The only way to tackle under-enforcement is to change the 
incentives ex-ante, which can be achieved by inefficient punishments like mandatory 
imprisonment. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the basic 
framework of our analysis. Section 3 describes the government’s choice of the detection 
probability given the type of punishment and Section 4 derives the optimal type of 
punishment. Costs of imprisonment are introduced to the model and analyzed in Section 
5, and Section 6 contains conclusions and further discussions. 
2. A model of crime and prosecution 
2.1 The population of potential criminals 
We consider a population of infinitely many risk-neutral individuals who are 
homogenous in all respects except the extra utility Ai individual i can gain by 
committing a crime. This extra utility, whose size is the individual’s private knowledge, 
is the sum of all gains and costs associated with committing the crime, possibly 
including moral costs, but it does not include expected costs from punishment. Let f(A) 
be the publicly known probability density function of Ai in the population and F(A) the 
corresponding cumulative distribution function. If an individual commits the crime, 
social welfare is reduced by the harm H, either because the crime results in such a 
damage to public property or because another randomly chosen individual suffers the 
harm H. 
An individual who committed the crime is convicted with probability r. If convicted 
he incurs a loss P, which is measured in dollars (just as Ai). Depending on the type of 
punishment τ, this loss can be due to a fine (in which case the dollar amount P is paid to 
the government), an equivalent prison term or a mixture of the two. The variable 
]1,0[∈τ  denotes the proportion of the punishment P that is paid as a fine. The 
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remaining part of the punishment, (1 – τ) P, is a prison sentence. We implicitly 
assume that for each dollar amount P there is a prison term of a certain length such that 
all individuals are indifferent between paying the fine P and serving this equivalent 
prison term. We do not require that the relation between the fine P and the equivalent 
length of imprisonment is linear. If the punishment is a fine (τ = 1), we suppose that all 
individuals can pay this fine, so there are no wealth restrictions. Therefore, there is 
mandatory imprisonment if τ < 1.6 Arguably, these assumptions are restrictive, but they 
enable us to study the type of punishment τ independently from the size of punishment 
P. In Section 6, we will show that our qualitative results continue to hold if wealth 
restrictions are introduced. 
It follows that individual i commits the crime if and only if Ai > r P. Consequently, 
the proportion of criminals in the population is )(1)( rPFdAAfq
rP
−== ∫∞ . Note that q 
only depends on the deterrence rP and does not directly depend on the type of 
punishment τ. 
2.2 The prosecution policy and social welfare 
The prosecution policy is described by three variables: The detection probability r, 
the type of punishment τ, and the size of punishment P. We focus our attention on the 
optimal choice of r and τ and assume that P is fixed exogenously. If P were 
endogenous, it would always be optimal to choose it as high as possible in our model. 
This standard ‘maximum-punishment’ result (see, e.g., Becker, 1968), which is clearly 
at odds with practical evidence, often does not hold in more detailed models. See 
Polinsky and Shavell (2000) for a detailed review of major justifications for not 
enforcing maximum punishments. 
The welfare function consists of the loss from criminal activity –qH, the revenues 
from fines τqrP, and the costs of policing –c(r), which have to be paid out of the 
government’s budget: 
 )(),( rcqrPqHrW −+−= ττ  (1) 
                                                 
6 In other words we define mandatory imprisonment as a prison term that must be served even if the 
offender has enough wealth to pay a higher fine. 
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This is a Benthamite social welfare function with zero weight given to 
criminal utility and the population being normalized to one. Since the emphasis of our 
model is on serious crimes, we follow Stigler’s (1970) argument and do not include the 
criminal utility Ai – rP in the social welfare function, in order to preclude socially 
beneficial crimes. Note that (1) does not include costs of imprisonment, since our 
results are easier to derive and to understand in the absence of these costs. Section 5 
will introduce costs of imprisonment and analyze their effect on our findings. 
2.3 The government’s role and objectives 
We assume that the government can only choose the detection probability r, but not 
the type of punishment τ which is fixed by law. The objective function of the 
government is a weighted sum of social welfare (1) and the government’s residual 
budget RB(r, τ) = τqrP – c(r): 
 )()1(),()1(),()( rcqrPqHrWrRBrUG −+−−=−+= τατατα  (2) 
where ]1,0[∈α  is the ‘budget preference parameter’. RB(r, τ) is the remaining budget 
after the police has been paid and fines have been collected. The assumption that the 
government has an interest in generating a large residual budget (i.e., α > 0) can be 
justified by a number of arguments (see Gordon and Wilson, 1999). First, government 
officials have obviously more power the larger the budget is they oversee. In addition, 
their compensation typically depends on their responsibilities, i.e. it increases with the 
size of their budget. A further argument is that the residual budget can be used to 
reward swing voters and thereby to increase the chance of re-election. A part of it might 
even be used for perquisites, i.e. for the government’s own rather than the public 
benefit. These arguments rely on another implicit assumption, namely that the 
government’s budget is not tight. This means that government savings or additional 
income are not redistributed to the taxpayers immediately, which seems to be a 
reasonable assumption given that tax rates are typically quite stable. The idea of a 
voting restriction is also included in the formulation of (2), because social welfare still 
enters the government’s utility function. We only claim that voting restrictions do not 
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prevent the government from partially maximizing its own welfare.7 Note that 
an alternative interpretation of the utility function (2) is that the government only bears 
a fraction (1 – α) of the social damage. 
Given that the type of punishment is fixed by law, the question arises why the 
detection probability is not also fixed by law, but instead determined by the rent-seeking 
government. The main reason is that it is easy to enforce the type of punishment as it is 
observable, whereas it is practically impossible to enforce the government’s effort that 
determines the detection probability. In addition, the optimal choice of detection 
probability is likely to change over time depending on the technologies of crime and 
prosecution, so that a fixed probability might not be optimal. 
Formally, the model can be considered as a three-stage game. In the first stage, the 
socially optimal type of punishment τ is determined given the expected behavior of the 
government and the individuals in later stages. In the second stage, the government 
chooses the detection probability r, and in the third stage individuals decide whether or 
not to commit a crime. Finally, criminals are prosecuted and punished as announced in 
the first two stages. 
2.4 Technical assumptions 
For the derivation of our results, four additional technical assumptions on the 
functions f(·) and c(·) are needed: 
(A1) The cost function c(r) is convex and continuously differentiable with 0)0(' =c  
and ∞=→ )(lim1 rcr . 
The last part of this assumption states that, no matter how much money is spent on 
police, it is never possible to clear up all crimes with certainty. Technically, the last two 
conditions prevent the corner solutions r = 0 and r = 1, respectively, and thereby a 
number of tedious case distinctions. 
(A2) The density function f(A) is continuous with f(A) > 0 for all A ≥ 0. 
                                                 
7 In most countries, general voting is not on individual policies or individual government officials but 
rather on complex bundles of different issues, only one of which is the considered prosecution policy. 
Together with the fact that elections are rather infrequent, this suggests that citizens are not able to fully 
control all government policies. 
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Note that we do not require that f(A) = 0 for negative A. Therefore, the model 
allows for individuals who never commit the crime even in the absence of policing. The 
assumption that f(A) is positive for all positive A generates the feature that full 
deterrence (q = 0) cannot be achieved for finite punishments P. Apart from being 
realistic, this saves us some otherwise necessary case distinctions. An implication of 
this assumption is that there are always some individuals whose extra utility Ai exceeds 
the harm H. As the welfare function (1) does not include illicit gains from crime, a 
crime-rate of zero is nevertheless welfare maximizing (if costs of policing and revenues 
from fines are not taken into account). 
(A3) Monotone hazard rate: 0
))(1(
)( ≥− AF
Af
dA
d , for all A ≥ 0. 
Intuitively this means that a marginal increase in the deterrence rP leads to a larger 
proportion of the remaining criminals being deterred the larger the deterrence rP is. It is 
a standard assumption in contract theory and is satisfied by a wide range of 
distributions, including the normal and the exponential distribution (See Fudenberg and 
Tirole, 1991, p. 267). 
(A4) 0
)(
)(' ≥
rPf
rc
dr
d  for all )1,0[∈r  and all P > 0. 
Note that this assumption always holds if f(A) monotonically decreases for positive A 
(e.g., for the normal distribution with non-positive expectation or the exponential 
distribution). Even if (A4) does not hold globally, it must hold for sufficiently large P 
and r > 0, because every density function eventually decreases. Hence, the results for 
large P will still hold if (A4) is violated. 
3. The government’s behavior 
An important feature of the model is the complete separation of the two variables 
‘size of punishment’ and ‘type of punishment’, which enables us to carry out 
comparative statics with respect to the type of punishment while keeping the size of 
punishment constant. In this section, we will use this tool to describe the detection 
probability r which the government chooses for a given proportion of fines τ.  
We start by formulating three basic results which will help to develop an 
understanding of how the model works. All three results have already been derived in 
similar models of previous papers. The proofs of all results can be found in the 
appendix. 
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Lemma 1: If the government chooses the detection probability rˆ  that maximizes its 
utility function UG(r) for a given proportion of fines τ, we obtain: 
a) rˆ  strictly increases in the harm H. 
b) rˆ  strictly decreases in the budget preference parameter α. 
c) The deterrence Prˆ  strictly increases in the size of punishment P, so that the crime 
rate )ˆ( Prqq =  strictly decreases in P. For P large enough, rˆ  eventually decreases in 
P and converges to zero. 
 
Lemma 1a implies that, ceteris paribus, more harmful crimes are policed more 
thoroughly. Lemma 1b states that the government spends less on policing the stronger 
its interest in the residual budget is. In particular, the detection probability chosen by a 
rent-seeking government is always lower than the socially optimal detection probability. 
Polinsky (1980) and Garoupa and Klerman (2002) already established result (a) and, for 
high harms, result (b). In contrast to our model, these two papers include criminal utility 
in the government’s utility function, which is the reason why they also find that rˆ  
might increase in α for small harms. Lemma 1c implies that, if the punishment P is 
already large, the government uses an additional increase in P to achieve two 
objectives: First it lowers the crime rate by increasing the deterrence, and second it 
economizes on the police by lowering rˆ .8: Basically, this is just the rationale of 
Becker’s (1968) high-fine-low-probability result: As the fine increases, the costly 
detection probability can be lowered without reducing deterrence. 
 
Proposition 1: If the government chooses the detection probability rˆ  that maximizes 
its utility UG(r) for a given proportion of fines τ, we obtain: 
a) If the size of punishment P is large enough, rˆ  strictly decreases in τ. Consequently, 
fines lead to more crime than imprisonment if punishment is harsh. 
b) If P is small, the optimal detection probability rˆ  strictly increases in τ, so that fines 
lead to less crime than imprisonment. 
                                                 
8 A similar result to Lemma 1c has been derived by Garoupa (2001). 
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c) As P increases without bound, the crime rate q converges to zero only if 
0=τ . If the government collects some fines from convicted criminals ( 0>τ ), the 
crime rate q converges to a strictly positive number as P increases without bound. 
 
The main statement of Proposition 1 is that more fines increase the government’s 
effort to fight crime only if the size of punishment is low. If punishment is harsh, the 
government’s effort is lower the larger the proportion of fines is.9 To develop an 
intuition for this result, note that an increase in the detection probability r has two 
effects on revenues from fines: On the one hand, the proportion of criminals that are 
fined increases, which leads to a rise in revenues from fines. On the other hand, more 
criminals are deterred, so that the proportion of criminals decreases and the revenues 
from fines drop. If the punishment is small, the crime rate is relatively high and the first 
effect dominates the second one. Here, an increase in the proportion of fines τ  leads to 
more policing and less crime. If the punishment is large on the other hand, the crime 
rate is low and the second effect dominates. Here, an increase in τ leads to less policing 
and more crime.  
This argument can be substantiated by investigating the first-order condition of the 
government’s maximization problem: 
 )()(')()()1( rPPfrPrcrPPqrPHPf ⋅+=+− ττα  (3) 
The two terms on the left hand side are the marginal utility from less harm and the 
marginal revenue from more frequent fines due to an increase in r. On the right hand 
side, we have the marginal costs of increasing r and the marginal loss of fines due to 
less criminals. Since the inverse hazard rate )(/)( rPfrPq  is well-behaved according to 
assumption (A3), the loss due to less criminals dominates the utility from more frequent 
fines if P is large enough. If τ increases, the net loss of these two effects increases and 
the optimal r decreases. Proposition (1c) demonstrates that this result persists if the 
government can punish criminals harsher and harsher. It implies that full deterrence can 
be achieved asymptotically only with an exclusive prison term. 
                                                 
9 Polinsky (1980) and Garoupa and Klerman (2002) derive a similar result in a model in which 
prosecution is delegated to a private agency. 
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An initially surprising result is that all statements of Proposition 1 also hold for 
α = 0, i.e., if the government maximizes social welfare. So even the socially optimal 
detection probability decreases in the proportion of fines if the punishment is high. 
A consequence of Proposition 1 is that, although the fines and prison terms we 
compare are equivalent in the sense that individuals are indifferent between the two, the 
two types of punishment have different ‘net’ deterrent effects: For small punishments, 
fines lead to higher deterrence, whereas for large punishments imprisonment deters 
more potential criminals. 
4. The optimality of mandatory imprisonment 
After having derived the government’s choice of the detection probability given the 
type of punishment, we can now shift our attention to the socially optimal type of 
punishment given the government’s behavior. 
 
Proposition 2: The optimal type of punishment 
a) If the government is benevolent (α = 0), an exclusive fine, i.e. τ* = 1 is optimal for 
all P and H. 
b) If the government favors a high residual budget (α > 0), exclusive imprisonment, i.e. 
τ* = 0, is welfare maximizing if the punishment P and the harm H are large. 
 
Proposition 2a contains the standard result that fines are optimal whenever feasible, 
but Proposition 2b demonstrates that this need not be the case if the government does 
not maximize social welfare. Even a small bias towards over-valuing the residual 
budget can overturn this result for sufficiently large P and H. 
The statement of Proposition 2b is striking: Mandatory imprisonment without any 
additional fines is optimal if the crime is serious. An intuition can be easily developed 
with our insights from the previous section: If the government places more weight on 
the residual budget, it will choose a lower-than-optimal detection probability rˆ  (Lemma 
1b). As long as H is small, the loss from this sub-optimal policy is small. However, if 
the crime is serious enough, i.e., if H and P are high, the harm from this sub-optimal 
policy can be substantial while revenues from fines are comparatively small, because 
most of the criminals are already deterred due to the high P (Lemma 1c). As a result, it 
becomes optimal to restrict the government to punish criminals with an exclusive prison 
term. 
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Technically, the driving force for this result is Proposition 1c, that the crime 
rate converges to zero only if the proportion of fines is zero. Analogous to Lemma 1b, 
the asymptotic crime rate increases with the budget preference parameter α if fines are 
used, so that it becomes optimal to force the government to lower the crime rate by 
prescribing mandatory imprisonment if punishment and harm are high. Thereby, the 
perverse monetary incentives to generate revenues from fines by allowing a high crime 
rate are eliminated and the government’s objective function is better aligned with social 
welfare. 
Proposition 2a provides the optimal choice of detection probability if there are no 
conflicts of interest between government and social welfare. This is the ideal first-best 
solution which is unattainable if α > 0. For this case, Proposition 2b gives the second-
best solution, which is clearly better than letting the government also choose the type of 
punishment τ. If the government could choose both, r and τ, it would always choose an 
exclusive fine and, consequently, a low detection probability, resulting in sub-optimally 
low social welfare for serious crimes. 
5. Costs of Imprisonment 
Up to now, we did not include costs of imprisonment in the analysis and the reader 
might wonder if our results continue to hold if these costs are taken into account. The 
answer is, that mandatory imprisonment is still optimal but that it is combined with a 
fine that covers the costs of imprisonment or a part of it. We did not include costs of 
imprisonment from the very beginning in order to isolate and better understand the 
effect of fines on the decision of the government. If these costs are taken into account, 
the problem becomes more involved and only partial results can be derived. 
Let us assume that imprisoning an individual for a length of time that results in a loss 
of P to the individual costs the government J·P, where J (for ‘jail’) is a positive 
constant. Then social welfare is given by 
 )(~)1()(),(~ rcqrPqHJqrPrcqrPqHrW −+−=−−−+−= ττττ  (4) 
with J)1(~ τττ −−= , (5) 
and the government’s utility function becomes 
 )(~)1()(~ rcqrPqHrUG −+−−= τα . (6) 
A simple comparison of the utility and welfare functions (4) and (6) with the 
according functions without prison costs (1) and (2) immediately implies that all 
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previous results continue to hold for τ~  instead of τ if 0~ ≥τ . For negative τ~ , the 
first order condition can have more than one solution so that only the corresponding 
results for large punishments P can be derived. 
Note that 0~ =τ  is equivalent to τ = J/(1+J). In this case, the proportion of the total 
punishment achieved with imprisonment is 1 – τ = 1/(1+J). This prison term costs 
J·1/(1+J) P which is equal to the fine τ P, so the fine exactly covers the costs of the 
respective prison term. 
 
Lemma 2: Let J > 0. If the government chooses the detection probability rˆ  that 
maximizes its utility )(~ rUG  for a given proportion of fines τ, we obtain: 
a) If τ > J/(1+J), all the results of Lemma 1 and Proposition 1 continue to hold. 
b) If τ ≤ J/(1+J) and P large enough, rˆ  eventually decreases in P and converges to 
zero. 
c) If τ ≤ J/(1+J), the crime rate q converges to zero as P increases without bound. 
 
Proposition 3: The optimal type of punishment in the presence of costs of imprisonment 
a) If the government is benevolent (α = 0), an exclusive fine, i.e. τ* = 1 is optimal for 
all P and H. 
b) For α > 0, a combination of mandatory imprisonment and a fine is optimal for large 
P and H, with the fine being smaller or equal to the costs of the prison term, i.e.,  
τ* ≤ J/(1+J). 
 
The formal result which we prove in the Appendix is that every τ ≤ J/(1+J) results in 
higher social welfare than any τ > J/(1+J). The reason is that according to Lemma 2c, 
the crime rate converges to zero for all τ ≤ J/(1+J). This implies that social welfare also 
converges to zero, so that all τ ≤ J/(1+J) are asymptotically optimal. For finite numbers 
P and H, there is a unique )]1/(,0[* JJ +∈τ  which depends on the parameters P, H, 
and α and on the functions c(.) and f(.), so that it cannot be derived explicitly under the 
weak assumptions of our model. 
As noted above, the fine exactly covers the costs of imprisonment if τ = J/(1+J). In 
this case, the revenues from fines exactly offset the costs of the respective prison term 
and the government has no gain from punishing an individual apart from deterring 
criminals. Here, the perverse monetary incentives of fines are completely eliminated. 
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Still, the government will choose an inefficiently low detection probability in 
order to economize on the costs of policing. This inefficiency vanishes asymptotically, 
but for finite P it might be optimal to choose τ even smaller than J/(1+J) in order to 
induce the government to increase the detection probability. 
The welfare function (1) used in this paper gives zero weight to the utility of 
criminals. Following Kaplow and Shavell (2001), one could argue that this welfare 
function is inconsistent with the Pareto principle. This is true if, ceteris paribus, the 
utility of an honest individual is independent of the utility of criminals. However, if 
honest individuals prefer criminals to have low utility, our welfare function (1) might 
very well be consistent with the Pareto principle. The more standard welfare function 
gives the same weight to all individuals and therefore includes gains from the illegal 
activity and disutility from imprisonment: 
 ( , ) ( ) ( ) (1 ) ( )
rP
W r A H f A dA qrP c rτ τ
∞
= − − − −∫  (7) 
As f(A) > 0 for all A > 0, (7) implies that there are socially beneficial crimes that should 
not be deterred. Under the first-best solution, the crime rate q will therefore converge to 
a positive, efficient rate q  as the size of the punishment P increases. Proposition 1 (a) 
and (b) continue to hold when (1) is replaced by (7). Moreover along the line of 
argument of Proposition 3, one can show that now τ* ≤ 1–α, i.e. mandatory 
imprisonment (possibly complemented by a fine) is optimal when α > 0. Hence, our 
main qualitative results continue to hold if the welfare function (7) is used instead of 
(1). 
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6. Conclusions and discussion 
This paper offers a new economic explanation of why serious crimes are punished 
with mandatory imprisonment even if offenders could pay an equivalent fine. We argue 
that fines change the incentives of the government. In the absence of fines, the 
government minimizes the social harm from criminal activity by choosing a policy that 
deters most potential criminals. In the presence of fines on the other hand, the 
government does not only want to reduce social harm but also to increase revenues from 
fines, two objectives that are in conflict with each other if the considered crime is 
serious. In that case, the government will – compared to the no-fine case – spend less on 
police in order to lower the deterrence and to increase the crime rate, a policy that 
increases revenues from fines but also the social harm from the criminal activity. If the 
government puts too much weight on revenue maximization as opposed to harm 
minimization, it will be optimal to force the government not to use fines by requiring a 
mandatory prison term. Thereby, the objective of revenue maximization is reduced and 
the government will concentrate more on the reduction of harm. 
This paper also provides a justification for the separation of powers, a common 
practice in modern states. Typically, the executive (the government in our model) is in 
charge of the police and the detection probability, whereas the size and the type of 
punishment are determined by the legislature (in countries with civil law) or the 
judiciary (in countries with common law). From the point of view of the standard 
literature on the economics of crime this arrangement looks cumbersome and redundant. 
If we assume, however, that the government does not maximize social welfare but puts 
a higher weight on its own budget, this arrangement looks quite intelligent because it 
ensures that the second-best outcome is actually attained. If the government could also 
choose the type of punishment, it would always use a fine and, as a consequence, allow 
higher-than-optimal crime rates for serious crimes. 
In some countries, including the United States, the local law-enforcement agency is 
elected directly and independently from the government. This arrangement can be 
interpreted as another constitutional way to overcome the rent-seeking problem depicted 
in our model, although it clearly introduces other incentive problems. Our model does 
not account for such a direct election. Instead it should rather be interpreted as a 
description of those countries in which the law-enforcement agency is not directly 
elected but run by the executive. This is the case for most European countries. 
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A unique feature of our model is the absence of a welfare maximizing 
principal. In contrast, the literature on delegated law enforcement (e.g., Polinsky, 1980, 
Friedman, 1984, Garoupa, 1997, Garoupa and Klerman, 2002) assumes the presence of 
a welfare maximizing principal who delegates law enforcement to a rent-seeking agent. 
In this setting, the principal can take advantage of many mechanisms (e.g., competition 
between agents, or decoupling the reward from the fine) that are not available in our 
model. While delegated law enforcement is an appropriate model for minor crimes like 
traffic violations of shop lifting, it remains unconvincing for serious crimes which our 
model focuses on. 
In our model, the only difference between fines and imprisonment is that fines enter 
the government’s utility function with a positive sign whereas prison sentences do not 
enter or enter with a negative sign if costs of imprisonment are taken into account. One 
could argue that the whole problem could be resolved if the fine is not paid to the 
government but to a third party, e.g., a charitable organization (which is indeed a 
common practice in many European countries). However, since the government is 
involved in virtually all aspects of public life, it can easily extract at least a part of such 
a fine, e.g., by lowering transfers to the recipient of the fine or by reducing services that 
are also provided by this organization 
A distinct feature of the model is the separation of the two variables ‘type of 
punishment’ and ‘size of punishment’, which allows us to study comparative statics 
with respect to the type of punishment without changing the size of punishment. In 
order to achieve this separation we assumed that each individual is able to pay the 
punishment P if it is a fine. Although this does not necessarily mean that all individuals 
are equally wealthy, this assumption seems unrealistic if the fine P is large. Fortunately 
however, all the results are robust to the inclusion of wealth restrictions as long as a 
non-negligible proportion of individuals is able to pay the fine. If we assume that an 
individual with wealth wi smaller than P pays a fine of wi and is imprisoned for a period 
that corresponds to a monetary value of P – wi (if there is no mandatory prison 
sentencing), then the government’s incentive to punish more individuals is still present 
although somewhat reduced compared to the situation without wealth restrictions. 
Assume, for instance, that the wealth of a proportion of θ < 1 of individuals is equal to 
w and that the wealth of the remaining (1 – θ) is unrestricted (or higher than the relevant 
range of P). For P > w, the expected revenues from fines are [(1 ) ]qr P wτ θ θ− + , i.e., 
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the government’s incentive to increase the crime rate q still increases with P. If 
the crime is sufficiently harmful und the punishment sufficiently harsh, mandatory 
imprisonment will still be optimal. 
Finally, note that the present paper only investigates the deterrent effect of 
imprisonment. It does not take into account that imprisonment also prevents crime, 
because notorious criminals cannot commit any further crimes while they are 
imprisoned. One could argue that this ‘incapacitation’ effect of imprisonment alone can 
explain the use of mandatory imprisonment for serious crimes. Ehrlich (1981) argues 
however that incapacitation effects are rather small because other individuals will 
replace most of the convicted and successfully removed offenders, in order to exploit 
the prevailing opportunities for illegitimate rewards. This view is also supported by 
recent empirical evidence (Levitt, 1998a, 1998b, Kessler and Levitt, 1999) which shows 
that deterrence is more important than incapacitation in reducing crime, particularly in 
the case of property crime. 
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Appendix 
Proof of Lemma 1 
The first-order condition is given by equation (3) in the main text. Using (A2), it can be rewritten as  
 
)(
)()1(
)(
)('
rPf
rPqHrP
rPPf
rc τατ +−=+ . (8) 
Due to (A3) and (A4), the LHS strictly increases in r and the RHS monotonically decreases in r. In 
addition, (A1) ensures that there is always a unique solution to (8). 
A marginal increase in H increases the RHS of (8), which can be compensated only by an increase in 
r. Hence the optimal rˆ  strictly increases with H, and analogously strictly decreases in α. This proves 
Lemma 1a and 1b. 
We relabel D = rP, and assume that the government chooses D rather than r. Then (8) becomes  
 
)(
)()1(
)(
)/('
Df
DqHD
DPf
PDc τατ +−=+ . (9) 
As before, the LHS strictly increases in D, whereas the RHS decreases in D. A marginal increase in P 
now leads to a drop in the LHS which can be compensated only by an increase in D. Hence, PrD ˆ=  
strictly increases in P, which proves the first part of Lemma 1c. 
In order to show that rˆ  converges to zero as P diverges, we assume the opposite, namely 0ˆ >→ ∞rr  as 
∞→P , which implies that ∞→D . If τ > 0, this immediately leads to a contradiction, as the RHS of (9) 
converges (the inverse hazard rate is monotonically decreasing and positive) whereas the LHS of (9) 
diverges. If τ = 0, (8) reduces to )()1()(' rPHPfrc α−= . Here we obtain a contradiction, because the 
LHS diverges or converges to a strictly positive number, whereas the RHS converges to zero. The reason 
for the latter is that )(DDf  converges to zero as ∞→D , because otherwise f(D) would converge to zero 
at a rate lower or equal to 1/D for ∞→D ; in that case it would not be integrable and could not be a 
density function. This proves Lemma 1c. 
Proof of Proposition 1 
We rewrite (9) as  )()()1()()/(' DqDHfDDf
P
PDc τατ +−=+  (10) 
Case 1, τ = 0: For every 0~ >D , we can find a P~  that satisfies the first-order condition 
)~(~)1()~/~(' DfPHPDc α−= , because – for D~  fixed – the LHS strictly decreases in P (from ‘∞’ to 0) and 
the RHS strictly increases in P (from 0 to ‘∞’). According to Lemma 1c, DD ~>  for all PP ~> . 
Consequently, D is not bounded and diverges as P → ∞, which proves the first part of Proposition 1c. 
Case 2, τ > 0: Rewriting (10) yields 
)(
)()1(
)(
)('
Df
DqH
DPf
rcD +−+−= τ
α
τ
, (11) 
Due to (A3) and Lemma 1c, the last term decreases monotonically in P and, being strictly positive, 
converges to some non-negative number. Since the first term on the RHS of (11) is strictly negative for 
all P, this implies that D cannot diverge as P → ∞. As a result, D converges as P → ∞ and the first term 
on the RHS of (11) converges to zero, due to Lemma 1c. Consequently, 
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  ,0
)(
)()1( >+−=⎯⎯ →⎯ ∞
∞
∞∞→
τ
τ
τ τ
α
Df
DqHDD P   (12) which proves Proposition 1c. 
We rewrite (9) as  ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −+−= D
Df
DqH
DPf
PDc
)(
)()1(
)(
)/(' τα  (13) 
Assume that (13) holds and consider a marginal increase in τ. If )()( DfDqD < , the RHS of (13) 
increases which can be compensated by an increase in D only. On the other hand, if )()( DfDqD > , a 
marginal increase in τ results in a decrease in D. As PDr /ˆ = , rˆ  increases in τ if )()( DfDqD < , which 
is the case if and only if P is ‘small’, because D(P) is zero for P = 0 and increases monotonically in P, 
whereas the inverse hazard rate q(D)/f(D) decreases monotonically. This proves Proposition 1b. 
As P diverges, the first term on the RHS in (11) converges to zero, so that the condition 
)()( DfDqD >  must hold if P is large enough. This argument works for 0>τ  only. For 0=τ , D 
diverges as P → ∞ (Proposition 1c), so )()( DfDqD >  must hold for large P. Hence, rˆ  decreases in τ 
for ‘large’ P, which proves Proposition 1a. 
Proof of Proposition 2 
If α = 0, UG(r) = W(r). Since )],(max[max)],(max[max ττ ττ rWrW rr = , we only need to show that τ = 1 
maximizes W(r, τ) for all r. But this follows trivially from the welfare function (1), because q does not 
depend on τ. This proves Proposition 2a. 
For part (b), we show that 0)()0(:]1,0(:, 0000 >−∈∀>∀>∀∃ ττ WWHHPPHP :  
Let τ > 0. Then )()()()0( 00 ττττ ττ rcPrqHqrcHqWW +−+−−=− . Due to Proposition 1c and Lemma 1c, 
q0, r0 and rτ converge to zero as P diverges, whereas qτ converges to 0>∞τq  and rτ P converges to 
)()()1( ∞∞∞ +−= τττ τα DfDqHD  as shown in (12). Therefore we obtain:  
 ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −=−⎯⎯ →⎯− ∞
∞
∞∞∞∞∞→
)(
)()()0(
τ
τ
ττττ ταττ Df
DqHqDqHqWW P .  (14) 
As H increases, ∞τD  increases and )()(
∞∞
ττ DfDq  decreases, so that for H large enough 
0)()0( >⎯⎯ →⎯− ∞→ cWW Pτ . 
Note that if τ decreases, then ∞τD  increases and )()( ∞∞ ττ DfDq  decreases. Consequently, if the RHS of 
(14) is positive for τ0, it must be also positive for all ),0( 0ττ ∈ . Setting τ0 = 1, proves our claim. 
Proof of Lemma 2 
Part (a) follows directly from the government’s utility function in equation (6) in the main text. 
The argument in the proof of Lemma 1c for τ > 0 also holds for τ < 0, which proves Lemma 2b. 
Note that assumption (A3) implies that 0)()()]([)]([ ≥⎯⎯ →⎯= ∞→ cDfDqDDfDqD D . As 
0)( ⎯⎯ →⎯ ∞→DDDf  (see proof of Lemma 2d for an explanation), this implies 0)( ⎯⎯ →⎯ ∞→DDDq . For τ < 0, 
all terms in )()1()( rcqrPqHrUG −+−−= τα  are negative, so that zero is an upper bound. As 
 21
0)( ⎯⎯ →⎯= ∞→DDDqqrP  and due to Lemma 2b, this upper bound can actually be obtained 
asymptotically if and only if ∞⎯⎯ →⎯ ∞→PD . This proves Lemma 2c. 
Proof of Proposition 3 
With the reformulation of UG(r) in equation (6), Proposition 2a immediately implies that 1*~ =τ  which 
is equivalent to τ* = 1. (Allowing negative τ~  does not change the maximum.) This proves Proposition 
3a. 
For part (b), we show that 0)~()~(:]1,0(~:,]0,[~ 000000 >−∈∀>∀>∀∃−∈∀ ττττ WWHHPPHPJ :  
Let ]0,[~0 J−∈τ  and ]1,0(~∈τ . Then )(~)(~)~()~( ~~~~000000 ττττ ττττ rcPrqHqrcPrqHqWW +−+−+−=− . Due to 
Lemma 2 and its proof, q0, r0, τ~r  and Prq 00  converge to zero as P diverges, whereas τ~q  converges to 
0~ >∞τq  and Prτ~  converges to )()(~)1( ~~~ ∞∞∞ +−= τττ τα DfDqHD  as shown in (12). Therefore we obtain:  
 ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −=−⎯⎯ →⎯− ∞
∞
∞∞∞∞∞→
)(
)(~~)~()~(
~
~
~~~0
τ
τ
ττττ τατττ Df
DqHqDqHqWW P .  (15) 
As H increases, ∞τ~D  increases and )()( ~~
∞∞
ττ DfDq  decreases, so that for H large enough 
0)~()~( 0 >⎯⎯ →⎯− ∞→ cWW Pττ . If τ~  decreases, then ∞τ~D  increases and )()( ~~ ∞∞ ττ DfDq  decreases. 
Consequently, if the RHS of (14) is positive for '~τ , it must be also positive for all )'~,0(~ ττ ∈ . Setting 
1'~ =τ , proves Proposition 3b. 
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